




INNOCENT OR NOT-SO-INNOCENT BYSTANDERS: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE GRAVITY MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF UN SANCTIONS ON NEIGHBOR COUNTRIES 
 















This paper examines two theories about the effects of UN sanctions on trade flows 
between land neighbors of the target country and the rest of the world. First, there 
have been claims that sanctions hurt neighbor countries by cutting off trading routes, 
increasing transportation costs, and disrupting established trading ties. We would 
expect that a neighbor’s trade with the rest of the world would fall, as a result. 
Second, there is extensive evidence that neighbors have been heavily involved in 
smuggling. As a result, neighbors should trade more with the rest of the world during 
UN trade embargoes, because now they also trade on behalf of the target. I employ 
the gravity model of international trade to show that, overall, a neighbor’s trade with 
the rest of the world tends to fall during UN sanctions episodes. This confirms the 
first claim above: overall, land neighbors have been “innocent bystanders” hit by UN 
sanctions. 
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1. Introduction 
With the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a proliferation in the use of international 
economic sanctions under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. During the Cold War the UN 
imposed only two sanctions regimes – against Rhodesia (1966-1979) and against South Africa (1977-
1994). In the 1990s the UN enacted sanctions against twelve countries: Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, 
Libya, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and 
Ethiopia/Eritrea.
1 
Economic sanctions are a blunt policy tool. They often hurt those people in the target country 
who are least responsible for the policies that prompted the imposition of sanctions, and who are also 
least likely to be able to change these policies. Allegedly, sanctions also hurt third countries, 
neighbors or major trading partners. Under Article 50 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these 
countries have the right to “consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of [the special 
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures].” A total of 21 states claimed 
injuries from sanctions against Iraq (Stremlau (1996)).
2 Losses stemmed from disrupted trade flows, 
increased transportation costs, dependence on oil imports from Iraq or Kuwait, and suspension of 
payments of sovereign debt by Iraq. Eight states consulted the Security Council about losses incurred 
as a result of the embargo against former Yugoslavia (Burci (1994)).
3 In neither case was 
compensation granted by the UN, in spite of the historical precedent with Zambia and Mozambique, 
which received UN-mandated aid during sanctions against Rhodesia in the 1960s and 1970s. 
A lively literature has sprung up discussing the economics of sanctions. Most studies have 
focused on the strategic interaction between targets and senders of sanctions, on quantifying the costs 
to both parties, and on finding correlates of the ultimate success or failure of sanctions regimes. 
However, the literature has largely neglected the impact of UN-mandated sanctions on third 
countries, either land neighbors or major trading partners of the target country. Compliance with UN 
sanctions is mandatory for all member states. However, trading partners and especially land 
neighbors of the target often face special costs and opportunities. There exist three sets of claims on 
how trade embargoes affect the target’s land neighbors: 
                                                 
1 See Table 1 for a summary of the most important facts about the thirteen sanctions regimes that have occurred since 
1989. This includes sanctions against South Africa which were imposed in 1977 and lifted in 1994. 
2 Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, India, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. 
3 Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Uganda, Ukraine. Uganda’s losses stemmed from an 
abandoned large road construction project. -2- 
First, using a neoclassical model of trade with two goods and three countries, Curovic (1997) 
has shown that sanctions benefit third countries if in free-trade equilibrium they exported and 
imported the same types of goods as the target country. Assuming that most targets are similar to 
their neighbors in terms of trade patterns (due to similar preferences, resources, or technologies), 
sanctions will benefit neighbors by moving the terms of trade in their favor, due to increased world 
demand for their exports and increased world supply of imports. Both of these shifts occur because 
the target is now shut off from world markets. The problem with this theory is that most targets and 
their neighbors happen to be small countries with hardly any influence on the world terms of trade. 
Therefore, this channel appears implausible, with the notable exception of sanctions against Iraq and 
their significant impact on world oil prices. 
Second, sanctions allegedly hurt neighbor countries by cutting off trading routes, by 
increasing transportation costs, and by disrupting established trading ties with suppliers or customers. 
Governments of neighbor countries have repeatedly made this argument the cornerstone of their 
demands for compensation from the UN. On the basis of this claim, we would expect to see a drop in 
neighbors' trade with the rest of the world following the imposition of a UN trade embargo. 
Third, sanctions allegedly benefit neighbors by enabling them to engage in sanctions-busting 
activities. Anecdotal evidence on the involvement of neighbor countries in smuggling is 
overwhelming. The problem with smuggling is that, by definition, it is hard to observe and quantify. 
Official statistics do not measure smuggling directly. One needs to think of indirect ways to infer how 
much smuggling is going on. The smuggling story would lead one to expect that neighbors will trade 
more heavily with the rest of the world during sanctions because they trade on behalf of the target 
(who is officially confined to autarky), and then smuggle goods back and forth across the border. We 
cannot observe how much smuggling is going on, but we can infer something about smuggling from 
the extra trade with the rest of the world in which the neighboring country engages. 
The common thread running through these theories is that they have implications for trade 
volumes. Under the “disrupted trade” story, neighboring countries should trade less with the rest of 
the world during UN trade embargoes. Under the smuggling story, neighboring countries should trade 
more with the rest of the world during UN trade embargoes. Theoretically, the impact of UN 
sanctions on neighboring countries is ambiguous – trade could go either up or down. Then it becomes 
an empirical issue. -3- 
Using a modified gravity equation with annual data on 82 countries for the years 1989-2000, 
this paper finds that neighbors’ imports and exports with the rest of the world decrease significantly 
during sanctions episodes, thus lending support to the “disrupted trade” story. This confirms the 
second claim above: overall, land neighbors have been “innocent bystanders” hit by UN sanctions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews existing work on the effects of 
sanctions on third countries and on the use of gravity models in analyzing trade embargoes. Section 3 
discusses the gravity model, the data, and the choice of variables and estimation procedures. Section 
4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The literature 
Perhaps the most monumental treatment of the economics of sanctions is Hufbauer et al. 
(2000) which catalogs 170 sanctions episodes (unilateral as well as multilateral) since World War I, 
of which 50 occurred in the last 10 years. Its main focus is on finding correlates of the success or 
failure of sanctions. Earlier editions of the book (1985, 1990) have inspired a large literature. Bonetti 
(1997) provides a critical summary. 
Existing work on the impact of sanctions on third countries is scarce. Hayes (1987) includes a 
chapter dealing with the impact of sanctions against South Africa on its neighbors. His case study 
approach is illustrative of the bulk of studies on the topic. While case studies are an important first 
step in identifying the impact of international economic sanctions, they have significant drawbacks. 
Case studies often rely on the assessment of injuries by “competent observers,” such as affected 
companies or government agencies. These rarely happen to be disinterested observers as well. 
Solicitation of handouts from the government or from the international community often biases their 
analysis. Even when objective, anecdotal evidence and eyewitness reports tend to neglect less visible 
secondary effects of sanctions and to confuse causality with correlation. This approach provides a 
partial coverage of the issue, at best. 
Curovic (1997) provides the only available theoretical analysis of the effect of economic 
sanctions on third countries. She does not distinguish between neighbors and major trading partners 
because location does not matter her theoretical framework. Sanctions are analyzed in a Heckscher-
Ohlin model of trade. In an endowment economy with two goods and three countries, sanctions are 
modeled as a restriction on the exchange of endowments for the target country. The severity of 
sanctions is measured by a parameter between zero and one, the fraction of endowments that can be -4- 
exchanged. The model formalizes the intuitively plausible result that sanctions hurt third countries if 
they were net importers of the good exported by the target in free-trade equilibrium. Sanctions benefit 
the third country if under free trade it exported the same good as the target country. 
Curovic (1997) also applies a modified gravity equation to the issue of economic sanctions. 
The author’s focus this time is not on third countries but on the target: whether there was a structural 
change in Italy’s pattern of trade following the short-lived and disastrous League of Nations sanctions 
in 1935-36, which were prompted by Italy’s takeover of Abyssinia. Curovic estimates pre-sanctions, 
post-sanctions, and combined versions of the gravity equation for Italy’s exports to 15 European 
countries over 15 years. The data test positive for a structural break in 1935-36, with Italian exports 
being diverted from participants to non-participants in the sanctions regime. Interestingly, the 
structural change was found to be persistent: Italy’s pattern of trade did not revert to “normal” once 
the sanctions were lifted. 
Hufbauer et al. (1997) also study the effects of economic sanctions using a gravity model. 
Once again, the focus of the study is not on third countries. The authors’ primary concern is with the 
costs unilateral sanctions impose on sender (sanctions-imposing) countries in terms of lost trade. The 
intensity of economic sanctions is modeled by introducing three dummy variables corresponding to 
three intensity levels. Almost invariably, the signs on these dummies were found to be significantly 
negative for the three sample years (1985, 1990, 1995). Of course, this result is vulnerable to the 
criticism (made by many, but most forcefully in Srinivasan (1998)) that these dummy variables do 
not really measure the effect of sanctions but rather the researcher’s own ignorance about what 
determines the remaining variation in trade flows for a subset of the trading pairs. A significant 
change in the dummy coefficients in years with sanctions relative to years without is what would 
have really established the authors’ claim.
4 
Hufbauer et al. (1997) further analyze the “echo effects” of economic sanctions: whether 
sanctions continue to pull trade away from the sender even after they are lifted, perhaps because firms 
in the sender country earn a reputation for being “unreliable suppliers”. Two more sets of dummy 
variables are added to measure the impact of sanctions 1-2 and 3-4 years after they are lifted. In 
contrast to the high-persistence result in Curovic (1997), the results here are inconclusive. They are, 
in any case, subject to the criticism outlined in the previous paragraph. 
                                                 
4 My paper fixes this problem by estimating the gravity equation as a panel, using both “fixed effects” (“within”) and 
“random effects” (GLS). -5- 
Montenegro and Soto (1996) is another study linking the issue of economic sanctions to the 
gravity equation but once again the focus is on the target. Their objective is to illustrate and quantify 
Cuba’s distorted direction of trade, due to decades of US sanctions and Cuba’s CMEA membership, 
as well as to predict Cuba’s direction of trade in a post-Castro world. Their econometric approach 
together with that in Soloaga and Winters (1999) is closest to the one adopted in this paper. 
 
3. The gravity equation 
The gravity model of international trade is the natural weapon of choice for signing and 
measuring the effects of sanctions on land neighbors of target countries. The gravity model produces 
a benchmark for trade flows which enables us to investigate if and how departures from "normal" 
volumes of trade between pairs of countries are correlated with the imposition of a UN trade 
embargo. Over the past 40 years, the gravity model of international trade has provided a remarkably 
good fit to empirical data, especially if one considers its somewhat suspect theoretical and 
econometric pedigree. In its most basic specification, the model relates trade flows between two 
countries to their size (as measured by national incomes) and the distance between them. The "full" 
version of the gravity model adds per capita incomes, as well as more measures of proximity, such as 
a dummy variable for a common land border and another one for a common language. More recently, 
the gravity model has been used to analyze the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on the 
world trading system. 
Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963), and Linnemann (1966) are universally cited as the 
pioneering works in the field. Aitken (1973) was perhaps the first to apply the gravity equation to 
PTAs. Jeffrey Frankel has written prolifically on the issue in the 1990s,
5 and Andrew Rose has done 
so more recently.
6 Leading references on the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity model are 
Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Helpman (1987), 
Deardorff (1998), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). A quick and safe way to summarize their 
work is to say that the gravity model is atheoretical and broadly consistent with most leading theories 
of international trade: starting with the Heckscher-Ohlin model, and including more recent theories of 
trade based on imperfect competition and product differentiation. Deardorff (p. 21, 1998) summarizes 
what the gravity equation should not be used for: “. . . because the gravity equation appears to 
                                                 
5 Frankel (1997) is probably the most comprehensive summary. 
6 See Rose (2004) most recently. -6- 
characterize a large class of models, its use for empirical tests of any of them is suspect.” However, 
the gravity model is very useful in providing a benchmark for trade flows between countries. Then 
we can search for departures from "normal" levels of trade and for correlates of these departures. 
The log-form specification of the gravity model I adopt is as follows: 
 
Language Contiguity
Distance PerCapGDP PerCapGDP GDP GDP C X j i j i ij
7 6
5 4 3 2 1
β β
β β β β β
+ +
+ + + + + + =
   (1) 
 
Xij denotes the log of exports from country i to country j in constant 1997 US dollars. GDPi 
and GDPj are the logs of national incomes of countries i and j measured in constant 1997 US dollars. 
PerCapGDPi and PerCapGDPj are defined similarly. Coefficients on incomes and per capita 
incomes are expected to be positive, reflecting the fact that trade increases with the size of the 
countries involved and with their level of economic development. Distance is the logged great-circle 
distance between the national capitals or major economic centers of the two countries, in miles.
7 It is 
expected to have a negative coefficient since it proxies for transportation costs. Contiguity and 
Language are dummy variables, each taking the value of one if the two countries share a land border 
or a language, respectively.
8 The coefficients on Contiguity and Language are expected to be 
positive. They are included in order to refine the concept of distance between two countries. 
My data set includes 82 countries. The country list appears in Appendix 1. These are the 63 
countries used in Frankel (1997) plus targets of UN sanctions and their land neighbors since 1989.
9 
The data set contains seven targets of UN sanctions and a total of 33 land neighbors. I had to exclude 
targets and neighbors without country pages in the IMF's International Financial Statistics (my data 
source for incomes, exchange rates, and populations). Eighty two countries give a maximum of 
82 x 81 = 6,642 observations in each year. The data span 12 years, from 1989 to 2000. The maximum 
total number of observations is 12 x 6,642 = 79,704. Data on trade came from Statistics Canada's 
World Trade Analyzer. To convert all numbers into constant 1997 US dollars I used line rf or wf 
(dollar exchange rates, period averages) from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, and the US 
Producer Price Index available through the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. For languages, national 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for a list of the cities I used for each country. Note that, for example, Chicago was chosen over 
Washington, New York, or Los Angeles, because of its central location. Sensitivity studies by other authors have 
confirmed that the distance variable is quite robust to the choice of cities. 
8 English, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, French, German, Japanese, Dutch, or Portuguese. -7- 
capitals, and contiguity I used the online edition of CIA's World Factbook. Finally, distances were 
calculated using the web site www.indo.com/distance. 
As a test of my choice of variables, I first ran a pooled equation for all 12 years without 
bringing in the issue of economic sanctions. Because of the pooled nature of the data, I added time-
fixed effects – 11 dummy variables for the years from 1990 to 2000. Table 2 reports results from two 
variations of equation (1). The dependent variable in both is log(exports). I drop all observations in 
which trade was zero. The dependent variable in specification 2 is total exports excluding oil and oil 
products (SITC category 33). Montenegro and Soto (1996) and Soloaga and Winters (1999) are other 
recent papers that exclude fuel exports. Oil trade fits awkwardly with theories of intra-industry trade, 
sometimes used to justify the gravity model. We rarely observe two oil-exporting countries buying 
each other's oil "for love of variety.” Furthermore, above it was noted that oil is one of the few 
commodities in which even small countries (like Iraq) might be able to influence world prices. Thus, 
it would be interesting to see how much of a difference the exclusion of oil is going to make. 
All variables in Table 2 enter with the expected sign and are very highly statistically 
significant. The reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity as well as to clustering by 
country pairs. Coefficients on GDPs are close to one, in line with previous estimates. The coefficient 
on distance is somewhat larger than what previous studies have found, but is broadly in line with 
them. The two specifications provide a reasonably good fit to the data: they have an R
2 of 0.72 and 
0.66, respectively. Finally, note that it does not matter whether trade in oil and oil products is 
included or excluded. 
 
4. The impact of UN sanctions on trade flows: the results 
Table 1 summarizes the most important facts about the twelve sanctions episodes that took 
place in the 1990s. UN sanctions against Sudan are not analyzed in this paper because the Security 
Council has imposed various diplomatic and travel restrictions against that country but no trade 
embargo. Since I only have annual data, I consider sanctions to be "on" for the entire year, even if 
they were in place for only a part of it. Thus, 1992 is considered to be a sanctions year for Liberia 
even though UN sanctions were imposed in November 1992. 1994 is a sanctions year for South 
Africa, even though sanctions were lifted in May 1994. I defer the discussion of a few more minor 
technicalities to the notes for that table. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 See Table 1. -8- 
As a first step in analyzing the effect of economic sanctions on neighboring countries, I added 
two dummy variables to the gravity model outlined in the previous section. The variable “One 
country is target” equals one whenever the trading pair includes a country targeted by a UN trade 
embargo, only for the years during which the embargo was in place. For example, the variable equals 
zero for trade between Iraq and the US in 1989, and one for trade between the same pair of countries 
for the years after and including 1990. I expect the coefficient on this variable to turn up strongly 
negative. The variable “One country is neighbor to target” is set to one whenever at least one member 
of the trading pair is a land neighbor to a target country. This variable is designed to capture anything 
special in the trading patterns of neighbors during years of UN sanctions. Because the theory 
(discussed in Section 1) is ambiguous, there is no presumption about the coefficient sign here. 
Results are reported in Table 3. Specifications 1 and 4 are similar to those in Table 2. In both 
specifications, the sign on the target dummy variable (“One country is a target”) is negative, large, 
and statistically significant. This result is hardly surprising – UN sanctions reduce (officially 
recorded) trade between targets and the rest of the world. The sign on the neighbor dummy variable 
(“One country is a neighbor to a target”) is also negative and highly statistically significant. This 
result lends empirical support to the claim that neighbor countries are “innocent bystanders.” For 
them, UN sanctions cut off trading routes, increase transportation costs, and disrupt established 
trading ties. This reduces trade between them and the rest of the world. Note that the coefficient on 
the neighbor variable is always smaller in magnitude than it is on the target variable. That makes 
intuitive sense. UN sanctions hurt both targets and their neighbors, but they seem to hurt targets 
more. 
Because the data set is a panel in which the cross-section unit is the country pair, I also 
estimate the model using “fixed effects” (“within”) and “random effects” (GLS). See specifications 
2-3 and 5-6. Each trading pair is unique, in the sense that each pair involves a unique combination of 
an exporting and importing country. Therefore, I have a very large number (6,642) of cross-section 
units. The cross-section fixed effects control for our ignorance. For reasons we do not know, trade 
between any pair of countries in the sample can be lower or higher than what the gravity model 
predicts, both in years with sanctions and in years without. The coefficients on the target dummy 
variable in specifications 2-3 and 5-6 are still negative and statistically significant, but also somewhat 
smaller than before. The coefficients on the neighbor dummy variable are still negative, but they are 
very small and statistically insignificant now. The cross-section dummies use up a lot of degrees of -9- 
freedom. Furthermore, when the gravity equation is estimated using “fixed effects” (“within”), the 
coefficients on the Distance, Contiguity, and Language variables are no longer identified, since they 
have no time-series variation for each cross-section unit. For these reasons, I view specifications 2-3 
and 5-6 as robustness checks, which broadly confirm the generally negative impact of sanctions on 
the land neighbors of targets. Finally, note that whether trade in oil and oil products is included or 
excluded does not matter too much for the results. 
As a logical next step, I distinguish between the impact of sanctions on exports and on 
imports by running the basic model from Section 3 with four additional dummy variables. “Importing 
country is a target” is set to one for all trading pairs where the importing country was a target, only 
for years with economic sanctions. “Exporting country is a target” equals one for all trading pairs 
where the exporter was a target, only for years with economic sanctions. “Importing country is a 
neighbor” and “Exporting country is a neighbor” are defined similarly. Table 4 presents the results. 
Once again, the coefficients on the target dummy variables are negative, large, and 
statistically significant, regardless of the specification. UN sanctions force targets to both export and 
import less with the rest of the world, and this is unsurprising. Once again, in specifications 1 and 4 
the coefficients on the neighbor dummy variables are negative and statistically significant, but not as 
large as they are for targets. The nice surprise are the panel specifications (2-3 and 5-6), in which the 
coefficients are now mostly statistically significant but smaller in magnitude. Once again, it does not 
matter for the results whether trade in oil and oil products is included or excluded. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Using regression analysis, this paper has taken a step forward in sorting out the sign and 
magnitude of the effect of international economic sanctions on neighboring countries. The general 
impact of sanctions on trade flows was shown to be negative – a land neighbor’s trade with the rest of 
the world tends to fall during UN sanctions. This confirms that, on a net basis, land neighbors have 
been “innocent bystanders.” Increased transportation costs and trade disruptions appear to have 
played an important role. 
The empirical results allow us to assign a rough quantitative measure for the amount of trade 
lost or gained during sanctions episodes, and for the corresponding losses or benefits neighbor 
countries derive from being at the wrong place at the wrong time. There is a large literature on the 
principle-agent problem in public law enforcement (see Polinsky and Shavell (1999)). Costs or -10- 
benefits from sanctions obviously enter the trade-off calculations of policymakers in neighboring 
countries. In imposing sanctions, the international community should take into consideration the costs 
inflicted on land neighbors’ as well as their temptation to “cheat” and participate in smuggling. 
It is important to discuss the limitations of this study. First, for a number of reasons, it 
considers only UN-imposed sanctions and leaves out unilateral sanctions. There have been relatively 
few UN sanctions regimes over the last ten years. UN sanctions are binding for all member states and 
thus compliance with them is universal, at least on paper. Data on UN sanctions regimes are widely 
available. Thus, UN sanctions are a good starting point for analyzing the effect of sanctions on 
neighboring countries. Unilateral sanctions are harder to analyze, primarily because of their sheer 
number. Hufbauer (1990) catalogs more than one hundred such cases, but the list is not meant to be 
exhaustive. There is much more variability in the intensity and weaponry of unilateral sanctions 
regimes. Some of these are redundant or never enforced. A final problem is that compliance with 
unilateral sanctions in the rest of the world is dramatically lower. 
Second, this paper chooses to focus on land neighbors of target countries and leaves "major 
trading partners" out of the analysis. A "land neighbor" can be defined objectively. On the other hand, 
it is hard to decide who counts as a "major trading partner." To avoid having to make arbitrary 
decisions, this paper focuses on land neighbors. 
Third, the empirical analysis uses data on officially recorded trade flows. It is reasonable to 
suppose that official data on trade flows between the targets' land neighbors and the rest of the world 
are as reliable as trade data in general. Neighbors might have an incentive to conceal the ultimate 
origin or final destination of the traded goods, but they don't have an incentive to distort the 
magnitude of trade flows. On the other hand, it is hard to take seriously data on trade flows between 
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Appendix 1: List of the 82 countries included in the dataset 









Bolivia (La Paz) 









Democratic Republic of Congo (Kinshasa) 
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) 
Cote D'Ivoire (Yamoussoukro) 
Denmark (Copenhagen) 
Dominican Republic (Santo Domingo) 
Ecuador (Quito) 
Egypt (Cairo) 







Hong Kong (Hong Kong) 
Hungary (Budapest) 
Iceland (Reykjavik) 









Republic of Korea (Seoul) 
Kuwait (Kuwait City) 
Libya (Tripoli) 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur) 
















Saudi Arabia (Riyadh) 
Sierra Leone (Freetown) 
Singapore (Singapore) 
















Zimbabwe (Harare) -14- 
Table 1: List of UN trade sanctions regimes with target countries, land neighbors, relevant dates and Security Council resolutions (1989-2004) 
 
Target country
1 Land  neighbors
 1  Dates of imposition and lifting of UN trade sanctions and 
relevant Security Council resolutions 
“Sanctions years” for the purposes of 
the gravity model analysis 
Afghanistan  China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Imposed: 19 December 2000, #1333  2000 
Angola Democratic  Republic of Congo, Republic 
of Congo, Namibia, Zambia 
Imposed: 15 September 1993, #864 
Lifted: 9 December 2002, #1448 
1993 – 2000 
Ethiopia and Eritrea  Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Somalia  Imposed: 17 May 2000, #1298 
Lifted: 15 May 2001, by Statement S/PRST/2001/14 by the 
President of the Security Council 
2000 
Haiti Dominican  Republic  Imposed: 16 June 1993, #841 
Lifted: 29 September 1994, #944 
1993 – 1994 
Iraq  Iran, Jordan, Kuwait,
2 Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Turkey 
Imposed: 6 August 1990, #661 
Lifted: 22 May 2003, #1483 
1990 – 2000 
Liberia  Cote D'Ivoire, Guinea, Sierra Leone  Imposed: 19 November 1992, #788  1992 – 2000 
Libya  Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Niger, Sudan, 
Tunisia 
Imposed: 31 March 1992, #748 
Lifted: 12 September 2003, 1506 
1992 – 2000 
Rwanda  Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
Imposed: 17 May 1994, #918  1994 – 2000
3 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) 
Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Romania
4 
Imposed: 25 September 1991, #713 
Lifted or suspended: 22 November 1995, #1021, #1022 
Lifted: 1 October 1996, #1074 
Imposed: 31 March 1998, #1160 
Lifted: 10 September 2001, #1367  
1991 – 1995, 1998 – 2000 
Sierra Leone  Guinea, Liberia  Imposed: 8 October 1997, #1132  1997 – 2000 
Somalia Djibouti,  Ethiopia, Kenya  Imposed: 24 April 1992, #751  1992 – 2000  
South Africa  Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Imposed: 4 November 1977, #418 
Lifted: 25 May 1994, #919 
1989 – 1994 
 
Source:  The United Nations via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/INTRO.htm. 
Notes:  1. Highlighted countries are included in my dataset. Certain targets and land neighbors were excluded due to lack of trade, GDP, exchange rate, or population data. 
  2. Kuwait was included as Iraq’s land neighbor despite the fact that between August 1990 and February 1991 it was a part of Iraq and, technically, a target of UN sanctions as well. 
3. UN sanctions against Rwanda were considerably relaxed in 1995 but the arms embargo remained in force against non-government forces. 
  4. For former Yugoslavia, I included as neighbors all the land neighbors of the old, pre-1989 Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics. 
5. UN sanctions against Sudan imposed in 1996 are not included in the table. The UN Security Council has imposed various diplomatic and travel restrictions but no trade embargo. -15- 
Table 2: Benchmark gravity equation 
 
 1  2 




Estimator OLS  OLS 




GDP of exporter  1.05  1.04 
 0.000 0.000
GDP of importer  0.95  0.92 
 0.000 0.000
Per capita GDP of exporter 0.18  0.21 
  0.000 0.000
Per capita GDP of importer 0.08  0.08 
 0.000 0.000
Distance -0.96  -0.90 
 0.000 0.000
Contiguity 0.72  0.81 
 0.000 0.000
Language 0.87  0.93 
 0.000 0.000
Number of observations  59207  59096 
R
2 0.72  0.66 
 
Notes: Both regressions include constants and time-fixed 
effects (coefficients not reported). Standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity-consistent as well as robust 
to clustering by country pairs. Both regressions 
define the dependent variable as log(exports) and 
exclude all observations where exports were zero. 
Regression 2 excludes oil exports. -16- 
Table 3: The effect of UN sanctions on trade flows involving targets or their land neighbors and the rest 
of the world – part I 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 










































One country is a target  -0.66  -0.49  -0.43  -0.94  -0.50  -0.46 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
One country is neighbor to target -0.44  -0.01  -0.02  -0.55  -0.02  -0.04 
 0.000 0.507 0.255 0.000 0.242 0.027
Number  of  observations  59207 59207 59207 59096 59096 59096 
R
2  0.72 0.36 0.71 0.67 0.37 0.66 
 
Notes: All regressions include the gravity equation variables from Table 2, as well as constants and time-fixed 
effects (coefficients not reported). OLS regressions report standard errors which are heteroscedasticity-
consistent as well as robust to clustering by country pairs. All regressions define the dependent variable 
as log(exports) and exclude all observations where exports were zero. Regressions 4-6 exclude oil 
exports. -17- 
Table 4: The effect of UN sanctions on trade flows involving targets or their land neighbors and the rest 
of the world – part II 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 










































Importing country is a target  -0.57  -0.54  -0.46  -0.56  -0.51  -0.43 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exporting country is a target  -0.73  -0.47  -0.43  -1.35  -0.50  -0.53 
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Importing country is a neighbor -0.15  -0.03  -0.03  -0.11  -0.03  -0.02 
  0.000 0.041 0.065 0.014 0.126 0.334
Exporting country is a neighbor -0.55  -0.04  -0.06  -0.76  -0.05  -0.09 
 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.022 0.000
Number  of  observations  59207 59207 59207 59096 59096 59096 
R
2  0.72 0.36 0.71 0.67 0.37 0.66 
 
Notes: All regressions include the gravity equation variables from Table 2, as well as constants and time-
fixed effects (coefficients not reported). OLS regressions report standard errors which are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent as well as robust to clustering by country pairs. All regressions define 
the dependent variable as log(exports) and exclude all observations where exports were zero. 
Regressions 4-6 exclude oil exports. 